The creation of the ASahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) sparked a debate: Would it help or hinder the rise of the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD)? Even before the official creation of the BSW, the Sahra Wagenknecht party slowed down the rise of the right and expressed the hope that the German political debate could focus on socio-economic issues, where the Left is traditionally the strongest.

The BSW has been present since the end of January and has participated in three elections: In the European Parliament and in the two regions of East Germany, in Saxony and Thuringia. Have these expectations materialised? Has BSW helped fight the right or helped move the political landscape to the right?

The June European election voters’ analysis suggests that the BSW’s results hurt Die Linke, the leftist party, and the ruling Social Democratic Party, the SPD. According to the Infratest Dimap Institute, most of BSW voters voted earlier for the first SPD (German Social Democratic Party) and Die Linke (meaning ‘Left’): 580,000 voters for SPD and 470,000 for Die linke. Only 160,000 BSW voters voted for AfD in the 2021 federal elections. According to this survey, most of the votes BSW issued on 1 September in Thuringia and Saxony also came from the left (in the broad sense), and only a small part of AfD.

At first sight, it seems obvious that the BSW receives the votes of the leftist parties and that AfD’s electorate barely reduces them. In the surveys of the beginning of the year, AfD needed about 22% of the votes at the state level, but it only got 16% of the votes in the European elections. Perhaps it is more clarifying than in the post-election polls almost half of its voters said that they voted for AfD, but not for a very strong conviction, but for a disappointment with the other parties.

These voters could, in theory, be persuaded to change their area if they were given an attractive alternative. This approach consists in proposing measures for the redistribution of wealth to at least divide a group of AfD voters. AfD voters can be more and more proletarian, and that process can be seen in the radical right-wing parties of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and other countries, but it is not inevitable. Socialist forces can and should resort to these voters, and not only for defending themselves.

The slow slowdown is seen as an alternative to the BSW establishment, according to a study by the
Institute for Economic and Social Research (WSI) linked to the German trade union confederation, particularly in East Germany and among those who have recently voted AfD. The PDS (Democratic Socialism Party, one of the precursors of Die Linke) was powerful in the regions and communities. BSW is successful in regions where the unemployment rate is high and the population is ageing. According to the WSI, it particularly attracts low-income voters, who are pessimistic about the future and who have little confidence in the instituciones.Los results of the BSW in Thuringia and Saxony mostly affected
Die Linke, although they probably also prevented AfD further. In these two lander, the polls gave AfD between 35 and 36 percent of the votes. According to Infratest Dimap, 26% of BSW voters surveyed in Thuringia stated that they would vote for AfD if they had not been able to vote for BSW. In Saxony, this figure would rise to 33 per cent. If this percentage were compared with the actual result of AfD, this match would remain at 37% in Thuringia and around 35% in Saxony.

Probably, many of the former Die link voters who have passed to BSW would not vote for the latter, as their fame declined even before the BSW became big. As far as the numbers are concerned, the BSW has been in a position to slow down the rise in AfD a little, but it has never been palliative. What can be said about their influence on political debate and media rhetoric in general? Does the relative success of the party mean, as the broad sections of the Left and the Liberal Left say, that the political horizon is shifting to the right?

Is BSW faithful to the top or bottom of the social scale? In economic and social policy, BSW has made its presence clear. One of the first demands of the parliamentary group of former Members of the Die Linke party was to increase the minimum wage. The party has also called for a revaluation of pensions. At the same time, it speaks of the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as a slogan of "economic rationality".

This approach is contradictory. The antagonism between capital and labour is particularly strong between SMEs and employees. For small businesses in economically non-dynamic regions, showing an attitude that runs counter to trade union activity is fundamental to tackling national and international capitalist competition. For BSW's left-wing forces, it is also important to develop in the short term an economic policy based on "antitrust alliances". For BSW, the federal government – SPD, Berdeak and neoliberals of the FDP- makes an industrial policy for big business, which distorts real capitalist competition. In this critique, BSW is very close to the FDP’s vision.

However, BSW and employees pledge a number of things to SMEs, and the contradictions that occur can lead to tensions in the party. On the one hand, BSW is opposed to increasing capital taxes and defends stricter sanctions against the unemployed to force them to accept lower quality jobs and, on the other hand, demands bigger retirements and stronger industrial and structural policies to support workers.

On the other hand, it is not very likely that Russia-Europe will return to energy cooperation, even at the low prices of industrial electricity that resulted from this situation. On the contrary, the fight between workers and employers is expected to intensify in the coming years. We will then have to see how the BSW stands in the face of the increasingly pressing demands of the German capital: a week of 42 hours, an increase in the retirement age to at least 70 years, a reduction in the right to strike in the public sector and a reduction in corporation tax. In this conflict you can see the shadow of a potential division.

According to Die linke, BSW’s economic and social policy, especially that of asylum, shows that the new party was a mere division of the right that left Die link. Even BSW himself stresses that he doesn't want to be a "Die linke 2.0." On the other hand, Link’s former leader, Sabine Zimmermann Die, who is the leading candidate for the BSW in Saxony, sees her party: "It's on the right of the SPD and on the left of the CDU (the Christian Democrats)." On the election night, Zimmermann stressed that on German public television ARD, the CDU and BSW had important political agreements, especially as regards "education and immigration policy".

Between the hammer and the anvil BSW
Die is on Linke’s right in economic and immigration policies, but the image of the mere division of the right is not so clear on a fundamental issue of BSW: peace and policies of distension. The members of the Bundestag of the Bundestag in favour of Wagenknecht, particularly because of their discrepancies in terms of peace and foreign policy, withdrew from Die link. One of the main reasons for his departure was that Die Linke did not sufficiently criticise the policies of the West aimed at sustaining Ukraine. For example, Die Link’s position in the federal government against NATO has been the reason why he has not participated with SPD and Greens, and Wagenknecht and other Members have always been defending that position against. This strategy, however, failed in the 2021 federal elections.

It is therefore easy to understand why many of Die Link’s basic members and voters have moved to BSW, particularly in the east. BSW Die is on Linke's right on socio-economic issues, or as far as immigration is concerned, but it can still be seen as a force against the establishment. Die Linke is still the most opposed to the establishment of the Bundestag, but less and less, and it is increasingly seen as a risk-free extension of the SPD and the Greens, a little more left than they do.

Immigration is also consolidating as one of BSW’s main concerns. The issue was not mentioned very much in the establishment of the party, but in recent months it has become one of the central themes, at the same level as the war in Ukraine and social affairs. Ten years ago, Wagenknecht said that Deutsche Bank was "a time bomb," and today it says the same thing about migrants as it does about migrants. In mid-July he wrote on the social network X [Twitter]: “Stop the uncontrolled migration that introduces clock pumps.” His party colleague, Sabine Zimmermann, also expressed himself clearly in Saxony’s post-election assessment: in the policies to be modified, he prioritized change in immigration policies without control. First of all, education and peace come later.

In immigration policies, the BSW has followed the general right-wing trend, without a clear conviction. If this were due to an election tactic, BSW should know that such an approach to AfD only benefits AfD. In fact, voters who consider it a priority to limit immigration prefer the original option to copying.

At the same time, it is to be welcomed that BSW, for example, is calling for a referendum on the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Four million German citizens opposed the deployment of missiles in the 1980s by signing the "Krefeld Appeal". Chancellor Olaf Scholz and her Green colleague Omid Nouripour have suddenly called for negotiations with Russia because of the weakness of Ukraine, the withdrawal of the Americans and the tiredness of the Ukrainian people, but the decisive cause for making those statements was the good results of the BSW.

The uncertain
future of BSW depends to a large extent on the national and international political climate. Predictably, in the coming decades, the cold war against China will prevail and legitimize with the unbelievable discourse of the "anti-autocratic democracies." The policies of distension are the ones that most distinguish BSW from the other parties, this gap is the one that occupies the most. And even more so if Die Linke gains the vision of easing his critical position with NATO at the conference in October.

Across the field, if AfD wants to become a government force, a more friendly vision of the EU, the euro, the USA and NATO will now have to work. As a right-wing and racist force, AfD will be able to establish alliances with other German parties, based on the commitment of the Western alliance and "the defence of our values". The path followed by the far-right modernising parties in Italy and France is the only way to gain power: The melonization of the party.
In the meantime, foreign policy developments will be decisive for BSW’s future. However, even though its policy of distension may be attractive, its future is undecided by confusion on other issues, and it is particularly contradictory with one hand seeking to defend the interests of employees and with the other the interests of capital.