On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary, the euro area finance ministers have issued a unified document in favour of the euro and the result has been surprising: nothing has happened. There has been no strong, favorable or unfavorable voice. It seems paradoxical when the expansive monetary policy to deal with the economy of the pandemic has enabled the euro project to be consolidated. It is the second currency in the world after the dollar, and it has certainly softened the costs of trade in the internal market.

We must not forget, however, that in the past decade the backwardness caused by stringent adjustment policies led to a serious euro crisis. In the years 2010, 2012 or 2015, the euro played such a narrow role that the Nobel Laureates Stiglitz and Krugman announced their disappearance.

We must remember that the euro was not created on the basis of the traditional criteria of economic and monetary union. The euro does not have a state to support its architecture, nor a general treasury or a single general budget. The European Central Bank owns monetary policy, but there is no common fiscal policy. Failing that, it is difficult to blur the inequalities caused by economic integration. Nor is there a single market in both banking and finance. These shortcomings in the institutional architecture have placed the euro in a serious port, and yet, if the single currency has been maintained, the euro is at the heart of the European Union’s political project. In the process of political integration of the European Union, the elites have not opted for the federal route. Without this, more gradual integration has prevailed, and economic unity has been a step in this direction.

To cover the deficiencies of the euro, its promoters told us that, by eliminating the costs of exchange of currencies and the risks of devaluation, the objective of economic integration would be achieved. It was said that this was going to open up cross-border trade, prices were going to stabilise, investment was going to increase and productivity growth was going to be boosted. Consequently, they added that there would be convergence in the standard of living of citizens and in the economies of the countries. In other words, the euro would inevitably boost the profits of the German in the European Union.

Twenty years later, most of these intentions have been suspended. Domestic trade in the euro area in the two decades has increased by only 10%, while the expansion of world trade has been 33%. Moreover, trade between Germany and the three countries of the European Union (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) outside the euro has increased by 63%. In the area of productive investment, a similar result is repeated. The bulk of foreign direct investment in Germany has been allocated to countries in Eastern Europe that are outside the euro. Therefore, while the divergence in the euro area has increased in investment and productivity, the convergence process with the European Communities outside the euro has prevailed. The contradictory development between countries shows whether we compare the level of income per inhabitant.

In a retrospective view, the euro’s promise of convergence has failed and the euro zone has taken the opposite step between the countries of the south and space. This reality is closely related to the institutional architecture of the euro mentioned above. The digitisation of the immediate future is a purely anecdotal challenge in view of the above structural deficiencies.