About half a million deaths, millions of displaced persons and countless information manipulations have left the hybrid wars in Syria. External factors explain much of what has happened in Syria. The West and its allies have made a hybrid war on Syria. However, this cannot be built from scratch, for this it requires an initiator of internal factors. Three internal factors played against Syria.

The first one is long-lasting. Although the Syrian Arab Republic is formally non-confessional, in practice it operates as a diverse and highly tolerant confessional State. The problem is that a minority of Sunnis (about 20 per cent of the population) supports the confession of the state as a Sunni Muslim. To this end, in the second half of the twentieth century, the Muslim Brothers made two uprisings and in 2011 they achieved the third thanks to the other two factors.

The second factor is directly related to the neoliberal measures taken by the Syrian Government at the beginning of the twenty-first century, beginning to distance itself from the socializing economy it had had until then. The country was weakened and isolated in the Middle East, due to the hegemony gained by Israel and the United States. The Americans included him on the axis of Evil and, as General Wesley Clark explained in his speeches in 2007, what happened to Syria could happen at any time. Then, thanks to the documents filtered by Wikileaks, we know that in 2006 the United States was planning a regime change in Syria. It is not known whether the main thrust of the neoliberal measures taken by Syria with the support of the World Bank was the desire to confront international isolation or the political conviction to change the economy. In any case, these measures generated socioeconomic and political discontent when the third factor appeared. When the Syrian State withdrew large amounts of aid for agricultural production, a severe drought began in 2007 and lasted for ten years. One of the pillars of the Syrian economy is the primary sector, which accounts for 20 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the backbone of exports.

Most of the 2011 protests were sectoral in nature and not regime change. But soon the Muslim Brotherhood and, in general, radical Islamism coopted them and used them for rebellion. The West, Turkey and the monarchies of the Persian Gulf quickly armed and financially supported several groups. Since then, many of those who participated in the protests have gradually been defending the Syrian Arab Republic through, among others, a government of concentration formed by the government and the opposition.

In the short term, Syria is going to win the war, but in the long term a kind of reinforcement of the factors that facilitated the crisis can be envisaged. The money that will be provided by the country ' s allies for reconstruction will lead to an increase in external debt, which will damage sovereignty. Moreover, the lack of funding will prevent the Administration from reaching all locations to undertake reconstruction work. Since the Syrian State is not going to recover in the short term the capacity it had before the crisis, it has to leave the space for private initiative to accelerate the reconstruction and restoration of services. Finally, although the Islamist extremists have not achieved their goals, they will be more prepared for the next battle, thanks, among other things, to their relationship and collaboration with the West, Turkey and the monarchies of the Persian Gulf.