The polls put Jair Bolsonaro as the new president of Brazil, which would be a great surprise to PT candidate Fernando Haddad. Bolsonaro is a special case, which relates better to the images, discourses and social bases of the classical extreme right than to other cases of the western populist right, but does not challenge any sector of the system, it is the most systemic of the systemic. He has had seven legislatures in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies since 1988, has served in nine parties, has three children in politics and defends the legacy of the dictatorship and its usual right-wing program, savage neoliberalism and authoritarian security. In addition, it has held numerous demonstrations against women and minorities.

Bolsonaro’s success is not understood without the mild coup d’état that has taken place in Brazil. He was first dismissed by the media and political circus Dilma Rouseff. Later, a judge trained in the United States imprisoned Lula Da Silva and told him that Lula was guilty of murder, although he had no evidence that he was guilty. Through Michel Temer’s neoliberal policies, the economic oligarchy regained control over the Brazilian government. The people, on the other hand, wanted Lula to come back to power. However, the polls showed that a part of the electorate that was willing to vote for Lula had Bolsonaro as a second option and, in the end, it has happened.

Three factors have been decisive for the functioning of Plan B of the Brazilian oligarchy: (a) the political and socio-economic discontent of the population (corruption, economic crisis and violence/crime); (b) Bolsonaro has exploited the weaknesses of the opposition (lack of leadership for Lula's imprisonment, media campaign of the left and stigmatization of the PT).

According to the survey conducted by the company Datafolha on 10 October, Bolsonaro wins in the poor region of the northeast, except in the rest of the counties, especially the richest and most developed in the south. In fact, in 2015-2016 they mobilized against the government of the PT in enriched and supposedly progressive cities. First comes the NGOs and the progressive people, and then Bolsonaro wins.

The leader of the extreme right in all age groups would be imposed among whites (59 per cent), they (52 per cent), mulatos (47 per cent), indigenous (41 per cent), men (57 per cent), women (42 per cent), Catholics (46 per cent) and evangelists (60 per cent). For its part, the PT candidate leads 45% of the candidates, as well as voters with a maximum of two minimum salaries (44%) and voters with a basic education level (44%). The far-right candidate achieves an easy victory among those who earn the minimum wage between two and five, 58% versus 30%; among those who earn between five and ten salaries, the ratio is 62% and 28%, and among those who earn more than ten salaries, 62% and 30%. Similarly, among middle-level education: 53% are deaned by Bolsonaro and 58% by the high level of education.

The far-right candidate has well united the middle and upper class which is its social base, while if he fails to achieve most of the lower classes, he maintains close competition with the left-wing candidate. The violence experienced by the poor and the poor every day has been the key to debates to attract that vote. For its part, the PT has not been able to put at the centre the material responsibilities of the lower classes in the first round. In the second round, the insult to the voters of Bolsonaro has lost prominence and the socio-economic discourse has gained weight in the campaign of the leftist candidate. Will it be late?