Let us talk about the time and reason for the creation of ETA. Explain us as And you understood it.

Jose Felix Azurmendi: The official creation of ETA was launched in 1960, according to the same sources. But there is also a letter sent by the early Etarras to Lehendakari, José Antonio Agirre, who expressed his genesis, written in the years 1958-1959. Iñaki Larramendi, then ETA member, said in Berria that it was then that the spirit of ETA began to germinate. But what do ETA and the next decade have to do with it? In my opinion, ETA was actually born with the murder of Txabi Etxebarrieta. Then there was a lot of division. One of the keys to ETA is the rupture between mili and polymili.

Joxemari Olarra: I asked Rafa Albisu [father of Mikel Antza] and Txillardegi [Jose Luis Alvarez Enparantza] and they did not agree. Txillardegi spoke mainly of ETA since 1967. Mikel Etxeberria Makaguen said that ETA was born in 1968. But by then there were several ETA.

Koro Garmendia: Suppose he was born between 1958-60. For me, the question is this: ETA was born in Franco. Twenty years after the end of the Spanish Civil War there was no international change, economic and political oppression was total, national and civil rights were destroyed. In the wake of Franco's prolongation, a generation that had not known the war provoked a new movement. Those young people believed that the world was full of FLN. There were waves of revolutionary guerrillas from Vietnam and Algeria. There was no revolutionary atmosphere in Europe, but there was May 68 in Paris. There were circumstances: new world, new references, new youth... A world without a church. In that “magma” ETA was born. The murders of Etxebarrieta and Manzanas were a milestone, but without stabilizing the 1958 movement the future would not come.

J. F. Azurmendi: You say “A world without a Church”, but the Church had a very important influence on the creation of ETA. The ethnic groups Jose Mari Benito del Valle and Jose Manu Agirre moved around the church of San Antón in Bizkaia. Eneko Irigarai and Txillardegi were more lay. Irigarai “then I was Marxist,” he says now, and I disagree. What kind of Marxist? Defining the profile well and the creators of ETA is difficult, the story is full of doubts. These doubts make it difficult to have an objective view of what ETA has been, it is a complex phenomenon. I think the creators were the bourgeois, not the little ones, and the intellectuals.

J. M. Olarra: As far as the specification is concerned, I agree. Txillardegi was mainly Euskaltzale. On the part of all the ethnic groups there was a great deal of voluntarism and a certain romanticism. The Basque Country was completely trapped, forcing this people to give a response to life and death. That's why ETA was born.

“ETA should not have been born.” What is your view on this maxim?

J. M. Olarra: It was not to be born! None of that. I entered ETA when I was 17. Then I fled north. Before I was arrested and tortured, I spent six months in the bed, “in custody” of the civil guard. It was the time of the Burgos process, it was a time of explosion and awakening. I had as a professor Father Luciano, the most Christian cure of war. He taught me what ikurrina was and how to do it. That's how I got into ETA, at that age, we don't think too much.

J. F. Azurmendi: The friars and priests had a great participation in the war resistance of 1936. In 1964, I was liberated from ETA, we were the first liberated. The tolosarra Xabier Elosegi Pataki made me aware of the nationalist environment of Eibar, Elgoibar, Arrasate, Ondarroa and Durango, which was called the second country. I went and had the first contact with the priest. By that time Juan José Etxabe was already walking, then Peixoto [José Manuel Pagoaga] and Txomin Iturbe arrived. But the first intellectual resistance, important in a way, was the priests.

K. Garmendia: Unlike these interlocutors, I did not enter ETA. It probably wasn't. A lot of people came into ETA by chance. “Help me make a commission…” and I will do so. Being from ETA was also that. I agree that "ETA should not have been born." ETA was not born based on climate, some made decisions, weapons could be used or not. They agreed yes. Throughout ETA’s history there have been opportunities to leave the guns, but from time to time some decided to continue. What was the village trapped? Yes. But ETA was born as a result of a decision, and it continued.

J. F. Azurmendi: The path taken by ETA was a concern in the Basque Government in exile. The disorder was big. The significant part of the village was dedicated to ETA. The Basque Government knew that it was not their war and that they had little to gain. This was publicly expressed by Lehendakari, Jesus Mary of Leizaola. “ETA should not have been born,” said lehendakari Iñigo Urkullu recently, and I think it is a simplicity. No one said, “Will we create ETA?” or, “Armed war yes or no?” Creators never shot a single shot. Those who started shooting repented at the age of two; Jose Mari Eskubi, Mikel Azurmendi and Txato Agirre... José Luis Zalbide entered the Basque Left Margin at the time of the transition. Makaguen's case is different, he never regretted it. Here's another key, Mario Onaindia wrote, "I didn't know who Julen Madariaga was." Damn it! Madariaga was a fundamental person in ETA. Two years after joining ETA, Mario doesn't know who Julen was. It has been a special march by the ETA militants. Etxebarrieta had only two years of militancy, and yet imagine who Txabi was in ETA’s history. The lack of transmission has been evident in ETA’s trajectory.

J. M. Olarra: If I answer “ETA had to be born or not,” tomorrow I will receive a call from the National High Court and after tomorrow I will be in a cell. I have been advised by the lawyer: “Beware of what you say!” This moment is very dangerous. Not everyone has the same freedom to speak. We are in the era of untold conflicts. The State needs trophies, which mark the current and future situation. The State stands firm so as not to leave the framework that it has set itself.

K. Garmendia: If ETA had not been born better for everyone. What was justified in Francoism? Yes. Many of us welcome the murder of Carrero Blanco, even many non-nationalists. But the time of ETA was too long, too long, things didn't happen, we did... The responsibility is great. More than what happened to us, we have to look at what we did: some did more, others did less, others remained silent, but in the face of many excesses we did not face enough.

J. M. Olarra: I can accept what you say in general, but that is why this people live. The roots are there. The creation of ETA joins the people, because the people gave it their support... [Azurmendi: a piece, right? ]. Okay, part of the village.

ETA was a generational phenomenon. Some came in and some came out, the organization was changing.

J. F. Azurmendi: It is very important to underline this. For example, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness were at the beginning and at the end of the IRA. I am referring to the second time the IRA has done so. In the last interview with the ETA Directorate of Iñaki Soto (from Gernika to Arnaga), for the way of responding, it is clear: the last direction has not lived the whole history of ETA. You have heard of many attacks, but you do not know everything and it is normal. How many times had ETA’s address been stopped in history? Again and again. It wasn't a proper generational transmission, either at the beginning or at the end. That is the explanation for the extension. ETA has been a teenage organization, and teenagers always think that the previous ones have done wrong, that they're going to do better. That has been terrible. The only stable reference in recent years has been José Antonio Urrutikoetxea, who entered ETA at a very special time, although it could not be. Julen Madariaga is one of the most prominent members of the initial team, but in the end it was already removed. Peixoto was not expelled, but was seriously injured and was blind. The lack of transmission has brought gaps, the fact that the news does not take into account the above has prevented a more satisfactory evolution and end of ETA.

In the history of ETA, these have been milestones: The murders of Etxebarrieta, Manzanas and Carrero Blanco, including the case of Burgos...

K. Garmendia: Carrero's one was very much discussed. If Carrero had followed the transition would have been the same? Some say that the murder made it difficult for the regime to continue, which Franco died, but the Franco regime did not abandon power for a month, as Adolfo Suárez took over the command of the government. Carrero's was not as effective as some say. To me, what happened in the 1979 elections was a tremendous surprise, an effective surprise. I was in college and I thought everybody thought like me. Suárez [Secretary General of the Movement], whom we met with the blue shirt, was imposed in the Spanish state through the UCD party. In Euskal Herria, on the other hand, the PNV and the PSOE were the winners among many parties. I experienced a delicate moment. “Things are not like you believed or wanted,” I thought. We were acting in the name and in the interests of the people, but when the people spoke, they did not vote as we thought. At that time, in order to enter a political party, a “course” had to be done. However, unlike my environment, I did not enter the EIA (Party for the Basque Revolution). The EEA stated that “Euskadi is an autonomous class framework for the Revolution.” I didn't think it was wrong, but I soon stopped believing it. “Could it be an autonomous framework for labor relations? Yes. But for revolution no.” I didn't get into the OEI, I wasn't honored. I stopped, however, around the OEI.

J. F. Azurmendi: Manuel Irujo – you have to read Irujo to learn about ETA and PNV – gave great importance to Carrero Blanco’s influence on the regime and saw no harm to his murder. José Ramón Recalde himself [ETA’s shooting] also rejoiced at “throwing”. Carrero was of great importance in the future of ETA. The attack led ETA into the world. I have linked the evolution of ETA with the Spring Revolution in Portugal, especially the evolution of the poly-mili. Some of the members of ETA moved to Lisbon and joined the revolutionary atmosphere there. That is what it caused in the subsequent ETA.

When Carrero happened, he was in Venezuela, in college. As I was from the previous generation, seeing what until then was ETA, I did not expect Carrero's. The Spanish CARTOONIST of the newspaper Le Monde told: “Leaving the Holy Mass is when the Ostia is approached.” The Ethiopians achieved great prestige among the guerrillas on the left of South America. According to Eneko Irigarai, many people went to Algeria to train, even some Arab states, both mili and polymili. Until Carrero was the one of ETA it was not known outside, then the change occurred. Juan Mari Bandrés and Teo Uriarte participated in the congresses of anger. International relations were very important for poli-mili.

After Franco came the transition and later the Tejerazo took place on 23 February 1981.

K. Garmendia: The coup d'état of Tejero [Lieutenant Colonel of the Civil Guard], ETA was expected to kill about 180 people in two years. The Spanish state was reinventing itself, ETA – especially the mili – wanted to prevent it. In the first legislature of the Basque Government, with Carlos Garaikoetxea as lehendakari, ETA moved from opposition to the dictatorship to obstructing the structuring of the CAV. There was a qualitative change. “The CAV project goes against our goals,” ETA thought. ETA was unable to take support measures for Franco before his death. It's another milestone.

J. M. Olarra: Whether or not they are, all of them must be understood in their context and time. In the Transition there were possibilities for “reform” or “rupture”. Each party developed its project. ETA decided to obstruct the reform and carry out its project through the breakdown. ETA “we all have to have the opportunity to carry out all the projects, otherwise there will be no democracy,” he said. He wanted independence, but not only wanted it, but “the possibility of developing it was needed,” he said, to sit at a table with the Spanish state and take it into account. In 1979-80 ETA carried out about 200 actions, which was a very tough time.

J. F. Azurmendi: Ideologically two specifications, one: Peixoto has just said that if the Gernika Statute had been developed together with Navarre, they would have rejected the armed war. I doubt, but Peixoto was someone, at least between miles. Two: Most of the attacks took place in Madrid. High-ranking military, “crisp actions,” writing in quotation marks just in case, dozens, terrible. Then he began to notice the Tejerazo. “ETA didn’t look for it,” a member of that time told me. But what did ETA want? Did you want to provoke a coup d'état, yes or no? The answers are not simple. Those in ETA argued that they wanted to reveal who they actually sent in the state. We knew the response of the state: repression. What was there in the village? Fear. Today, discussing what happened at the time is important to know the history of ETA.

K. Garmendia: ETA started to compare with high-level institutions, but there was a lot of improvisation. I do not know what would have happened if Navarre had been in the Gernika Statute, but the path that ETA chose before the reform was the break. I was an Euskadiko Ezkerra militant and the question was: "Is it enough to leave?" Yes or no?” Within nationalism, PNV and EE, along with the PSE, thought it was enough. The ppp was not in favour of the Statute, let us not forget it. It should also be remembered that: ETA decided to continue killing to cause a fracture. It was the biggest break. And what has remained today, above all? The suffering caused.

Talking about the tejazo: ETA called the State into question, but the State was strengthened, it was consolidated for decades, and then came what was called “everything is ETA”, macro summits, etc. Probably, if the State's action had been otherwise, better, but society was sick. For me, the Catalan process has been much more effective than ETA. The Catalan process has mobilized the pillars of the Spanish State, which have not been used by weapons. What a pity that ETA has not taken that path. When the Spanish left and the progressives shut down Egin and Egunkaria, they said nothing. The State was strengthened.

It's Joxemari Olarra's turn. What do you say about the evolution of the Abertzale and ETA left?

J. M. Olarra: After the Lizarra-Garazi Agreement, the armed struggle changed. I recognise this, the protection of society, the support of a part of it or the support were modified, not only the consequences of the armed struggle, but the consequences of the ideological struggle. That is, the struggle between the left and the State, as well as the quality of the tools, have always had to be analyzed. ETA has partly influenced the policy of Euskal Herria during the 60 years and that of the State as well. Some say it has been for “evil” and others for “good”. It is also the subject of debate. Koro referred to what is Catalan, OK. But this has happened after ETA has finished, in a new context. The armed struggle, for a moment, in the early 1980s, put the state against the wall. I am not saying that there were chances of winning through armed struggle, I am not going to say those ridiculous words, but it conditioned politics and our lives, and the ‘clean actions’ – as José Felix said, to be understood properly – did not produce contradictions. In general, there were discordant people looking the other way: “I would do something,” it was the motto. At that time ETA had enormous strength and influence. At this time when we are fighting for the story, we seem to have forgotten the situation of this people in recent years. For example, at one time, when an aunt was killed, a general strike took place at the national, regional or local levels. What was that? That is a finding, not my opinion. We have not known the general strikes in favour of those in front of us. You also have to get it into the story.

K. Garmendia: That strikes were taking place, all right. But it is also true that the demonstrations that took place in the hours before the death of Michael Ángel Blanco were shocking. Mobilisations against ETA have been very important. What should be the support measurement system? Well, for me, it's an election. With the elections, support to the Abertzale left was declining. I know that all the people voting on the Abertzale left were not in favour of ETA, and I was happy, even if the Abertzale left supported ETA. Almost twenty years before Blanco's murder, ETA kidnapped and killed José María Ryan [Lemoiz's senior engineer], a lot of people went out in the street. This support had to be questioned, but it had not been sufficiently argued. The condition of the victims was changing.

In the fight against the Lemoiz Nuclear Power Plant, each of them claimed its reasons for this. Ecologists were not happy.

J. F. Azurmendi: Yes, but, contradicting the contradiction, ETA had strong support in society for it to continue. However, ETA members saw that support started to change. That is, until then the commands were moved in a “simple” way and since then not.

K. Garmendia: It was not worth continuing, among other things, because ETA infected the ecologists’ struggle. Did he have enough support to continue? It's the same, ETA became a problem.

J. F. Azurmendi: Previously, Joxemari said that not all of us have the same freedom to speak. All right, but ETA has also taken advantage of it to justify what it has done and to silence rather than give “answers”. Then came the “socialization of suffering”. Terrible.
That said, the phrase “all victims are equal” is false. For example, the brother-in-law of former Uruguayan President Pepe Mujica said about the murder of a baserritarra: “He saw the peasants [tupamaros] some arsenals and stopped him.” The discussion broke out. “What will we do?” He was poisoned to death. According to his brother-in-law, “that was a murder” and adds: "An FBI agent came to teach local police the techniques to torture and was also killed. That was the execution.” An armed organization incorporates some actions within that logic, but there are also others that do not enter it. ETA has done both. Now, is ETA going to say that at the time of the story, "these were fine and these were wrong?" It is very difficult to write the story correctly.

J. M. Olarra: I insist: armed struggle must be analysed in terms of context. For example, “Meliton Manzanas ‘pull’ was not good,” one of them said recently. Another responds: “If I had lived, how many other citizens did they have to torture?” Sometimes we move into sterile discussions, each one has their own opinion and acts accordingly. He has his own ethics or morals, or he's afraid to fight. Many times we live in the art of “not doing”, even if we are in favor of doing it, because one is not able to do it. Some say that “I have always been against armed struggle.” But it's partly a lie. Many people hadn't participated in the armed struggle because they hadn't wanted to risk their lives, but they thought: “Do it yourself and I will applaud.” It's been a "pose" around ETA. Some of them never opened the door because they disagreed, and that's very respectable. It couldn't be otherwise.

Has ETA not in any way imposed armed struggle?

J. M. Olarra: Armed struggle has not been a balm. Its consequences are severe, sometimes different, sometimes it opens up spaces for the struggle – and for democracy – and sometimes closes them. But, I repeat, I cannot make an assessment of that at the moment, the current political situation does not allow me. I say that the armed struggle has had strength, support and strategy. The armed struggle is at the forefront of the state to put democracy in place and, in our case, to develop Euskal Herria. The truth is that it has sometimes failed, quite the opposite. It has also generated
contradicciones.Las negotiations between the Government of Spain and ETA in Algeria focused on the issue of violence. Option...

J. F. Azurmendi: ...it was not a real option. But to study it, we would need a book. As far as the vanguard is concerned, I am referring to secrecy: secrecy is very easy to control people. One example: When the official sector of
HASI, 150 members, led by Txomin Ziluaga, won the Congress of Zestoa, [ETA] launched all the HASI paintings because the new direction questioned the armed war. The soft part had not started. The attack took place at the time of the Hipercor attack in Pennsylvania. The director of egin was previously dismissed. Excuse me for being shown [Azurmendi was the director]. A messenger came; I will not give a name; “They say ‘the others’” or “the boys say…”, he said. The discussion is over. ETA used clandestine use. Patxi Zabaleta, on the one hand, or Iñaki Esnaola and Christiane Fando Hill on the other, treated them as enemies, as collaborators of Rafael Vera, on the other. “We disagree with their approach”, in short, but to say that Fando and Esnaola were in favor of Vera... Please. The difference between those who were “on the other side” – in the clandestine – and those who were here was enormous. The Abertzale left now has the possibility of clarifying what was the ETA strategy on which it was based.

On support: Those who have closely supported ETA have always been very few. His family and friends were the ones who contributed the most since the beginning. Our houses belonged to the family and asked nothing: “They were Majos boys and their friends.” Armed war was not discussed among the neighbors. It began to be questioned by the year 2000. I wrote in Deia about the murder of an ETA militant [Luzia Urigoitia, Lutxi]. The letter was not circulated, but ARGIA took the floor at the hand of Pello Zubiria. It had an echo, or at least it was discussed. Until then, it was not questioned in this way. Perhaps because in ARGIA it was in Euskera, it spread because it reached a limited scope. The truth is that at that time it was not read much and not yet today. It would be worth reading the letter. Zubiria was then quite questioned by the official Abertzale left, and then also. Many leaders of the Abertzale left used it, including Santi Brouard, “our boys say it”. The boys had moral strength.

K. Garmendia: Most of all, they had weapons ...

J. M. Olarra: ...and trust, and they were mystified... [Garmendia: “They took advantage of the epic ...”], OK, that’s the word. Ideology began to lose and emotions were won, that is, people were reached through emotions more quickly than through ideology. Things were changing and context was changing as well. José Félix has referred to the “socialization of suffering”. This is the phrase that the enemy has introduced to ETA [Azurmendi: “The phrase perhaps, but…”]. Let me explain to you, that ETA killed Gregorio Ordóñez and then ... [Azurmendi: “And what did he bring later?”]. I want to explain how it started, it's another thing than how it ended. ETA "is attacking the armed forces and in vain. But who sends out in the armed forces? Politicians,” he said. He took a leap. Then another debate is what kind of politicians were killed. There was a change: ETA went from beating the uniformed to beating the non-uniformed.

K. Garmendia: What do you think, but was it appropriate at the time to use arms? That is the question. Without going into ethics. It has always been discussed about the appropriateness of the political strategy, which was what brought division into ETA, was a constant. Those who said no, they became traitors to those who followed. That brought more and more “traitors.” Clandestine organisations are very hierarchical, undemocratic, impose militarism and become their own ends. This is not just the case with ETA. What changed in 2011 to abandon the armed struggle? Had anything changed inside? Nothing had changed out. Joxemari, you say that “ETA has used different strategies at the time, cycles, cycles.” Yes, and they've all failed. They've come to where they've come. ETA started killing politicians with Ordoñez and then murdered Blanco and Buesa, and López de la Calle... and tried to kill Recalde. The last two were tortured by Manzanas. The argument is that the politician is occupying, and that has troubled me. Ordóñez was “our”, he liked it or not. The thought of the Maoists is this: “The people are me and the people who don’t think like me are not the people.” “The Spaniards cannot be here,” some say. But these are elected by popular vote. This division of rights according to the dichotomy “what is ours” and “what is not ours” worries me for the future.

Smell, what changed inside and outside?

J. M. Olarra: To begin with, the international situation. Jihadism spread. Under the same hat was introduced the fight of ETA and the fight of yihadismo.El terrorism had become everything. This gave the State an extraordinary force. The real debates in ETA began in 2001, starting on 11 March. The Atotxa attack completely affected ETA’s armed struggle.

But ETA went on.

J. M. Olarra: The armed organization is not a car that stops after pressing the brake. It's a transatlantic. You enter the Concha de San Sebastian and you need the entire bay to turn it around. The front and back do not come in at the same time, but you have to get it all out. It is a question of returning the entire packaging. If you cause division, others may decide to continue armed struggle. I mean, we all have to go up the mountain, some of them take three hours, others five. You have to work as a team, sometimes you wait and go up together, leaving no one thrown away.

J. F. Azurmendi: There is a need for another explanation. For example, the creation of the Aralar party. The differences have been historic, usually the minority went home, the minority of them had already ended. With Aralar, that didn't happen. He had gathered a good number of votes, about ten thousand. Until then, some had left the PNV or the PSOE, which gave them some support. In Iparralde there was a strong response against ETA. The majority of the local Abertzale left, who supported the armed struggle, stood against it. Close friends said: “Quite a bit, this is over.” And he realized that, of course.

K. Garmendia: ETA picked up the last wagon from the last train and I was happy. Joxemari states that “the fact that ETA and the Abertzale left have taken a joint decision is an intrinsic value.” OK. It's good for everyone and especially for them. However, ETA allowed several trains to pass for different reasons. But going up to one train or going up to another, the end would be different. If he had taken the Algerian train, according to the State, it could have been insufficient, but ETA would have gone down in history as the institution that has negotiated with the State. If he had taken advantage of the Lizarra-Garazi Agreement, he would have imagined the unity of the Abertzales. It was then that the Loiola Agreement, with the PSOE halfway and with Rodríguez Zapatero at the head of the presidency, arrived. Finally, ETA has unilaterally ended, because it has had no choice. Climbing the mountain all together is important, some may be proud of it, but today who can say: “I killed José Mari Uria and Isaiah Carrasco. I killed Jose Mari Korta!” But why? No one says that “it was good for the freedom of this people.”

J. M. Olarra: There are few fools in this town. You will not blame yourself.

K. Garmendia: I don't want to drag anyone. However, during the mountain climb there have been many deaths. All those of democracy are useless. And what they did, since the T-4 attack in Madrid, is much worse strategically. Each leader of the Abertzale left considers his strategy appropriate: “When I decided to leave it was that moment, all the above was good, not the later.” Is this the right time for prisoners?

J. M. Olarra: There are questions and reflections on this, and it's one. Are they advancing through armed struggle or are the State strengthened? It looks as if it is justifying the armed struggle. And it's not.

K. Garmendia: ETA, at every moment, valued the effectiveness of the armed struggle. But where is people's opinion? Most people had another opinion [Azurmendi: and many people of yours]. Is the use of violence useful if most do not want? I am concerned about authoritarianism. For example, when the Abertzale left won in Gipuzkoa, many of its militants continued in the keys of the old scheme: “We have reached the way up.” None of that. “Like you others, you will sometimes be walking up and down.” You're going to do well to the extent that you can make policy. They continued to believe that they represented the people.

J. M. Olarra: That is not a reflection of the Abertzale left, let alone. The Abertzale left assumed the Council of Gipuzkoa after the end of ETA, it was a souffle, a new illusion. The PNV has already decided not to join the other parties, as it feared that the social base of the Abertzale left would become angry. The Abertzale left was the one who managed Gipuzkoa’s policy, well or badly. It's valuable. However, to date, the PNV has focused, is blinding and will become even more cumbersome with the votes of pp and PSOE. The PNV adds votes against independence, the vote of fear. Under the motto “Beware of the history of the Abertzale left”.

K. Garmendia: That is also a topic of debate, because the vote to start is not for anyone. After 40 years, the vote is changing. The trend of our generation has changed. [Olarra: “Accept”]. What worries me is that you think your votes aren't worth as much as everyone else.

J. M. Olarra: Anyway, we're in a time of story, and it seems that the armed struggle has been, and it's stopped. But here the others follow “their armed struggle.” Of course, that is legal.

J. F. Azurmendi: The time of the story is difficult. There's the Valley of the Fallen. That's not in Germany, because the Germans lost the war, but here Franco won. After the dictatorship democracy was established, the Francoists won the transition.

Among them are those who disagree with the way ETA is terminated.

J. M. Olarra: Prisoners are former ETA militants and not all of them are from ETA, of course. Faced with possible dissidents, I say this with respect, this end has not been made from one moment to the next. It's been milestones, it's been a long process. In Lizarra-Garazi, the left Abertzale and the PNV did not understand the process in the same way. The PNV offered a runway to the left Abertzale that did not accept it. On the other hand, Loiola's process started when Estella's process ended. In December 1999, at the request of the PSOE, we held a meeting with Redondo Terreros, Benegas and Egiguren on behalf of the Abertzale left. Arnaldo Otegi, Kepa Gordejuela and I. The PSOE wanted to face the hegemony of the PNV. The Minister of the Interior, Jaime Mayor Oreja, has not given up the presidency of the government. The PSOE informed Oreja of everything we were talking about. Steps were taken, but the pp decided to break the table without saying anything to the PSOE. How? Arresting me. The meetings were recorded. The ABC and La Razón newspapers burst everything. The PSOE was frightened and left behind. Then, Jesus Egiguren continued with Arnaldo alone. The PSOE was removed from the PNV, but we wanted it in the PNV process. How can we move forward if not? The internal conflict was terrible and the road broke. In the State there were two approaches, we influenced politics. There are cycles in politics. That's what it is today.

J. F. Azurmendi: Unfortunately, however, the PNV 15 years ago read about ETA and what it does now is the same thing it does now. Two words on the end of ETA: Spain wants ETA to go down in history as a band, but a band does not end in Arnaga. The people who have gone through Arnaga and Aiete are high-level politicians, there's somebody in the world of politics. Some have made a great effort to put this to an end.

Finally, what is your vision of the post-ETA era?

J. F. Azurmendi: This was not just a matter of ETA. ETA has moved in an environment, it has had a lot of people by its side. As a political problem, we have to think about it together, without getting angry. All Basques are involved, whether they are Basque or not, including prisoners. The PNV should say to the Socialists – who have a particular responsibility for this – “Either we solve it or you will not have our help”. Jonan Fernández, for example, wants to bring the ETA phenomenon to school. Is it worth doing now? Shouldn't we wait? At least until the prisoners are resolved.

J. M. Olarra: There are two projects in the Basque Country: PNV and left abertzalism; EH Bai in Iparralde and EH Bildu in Hegoalde. Pp and PSOE have no project. The PNV is not my enemy, I am sure. We are at a crossroads. As for the situation in Catalonia, the independentists can fill the streets, have the institutions in their hands, but they lack control of the territory, which the Spanish armed forces have. Here is the crossroads of the patriots from there and here. Spain is declining. An agreement cannot be reached with the Spaniards because they do not know how to reach an agreement. PNV and EH Bildu have there what to discuss, there is the question and the concern.

K. Garmendia: The end of ETA has been a failure. I am glad, however, that your staging has been made visible. We have a huge challenge in redirecting coexistence. We are not going to reach full agreement with the Spaniards, but neither have the nationalists agreed. There have been one-off but minor agreements. On the subject of prisoners: the Basque conflict must be resolved well. Prisoners must approach, liberate the sick and grant the other prisoners the rights they receive to any other prisoner, to a progressive degree. When to leave? This has to do with the process of each of the prisoners. For victims of terrorism and torture, recognition and reparation. One thing, not everyone here recognizes the plurality of society. That is what ETA has provoked. ETA has not respected the whole of society. We don't all have to be friends, one thing is to live together and another to be friends. We don't have the same project, but let's respect each other.

J. M. Olarra: Two words about the victims: I have been arrested eighteen times, imprisoned five times. I've been tortured and I've been in exile. Am I a victim? No. I am a volunteer in this fight and I have every respect for the victim, provided that she also respects me. The exercise of the status of victim is unacceptable to make policy.

VOCALS:

Jose Felix Azurmendi: Journalist
Durango, 1941. He spent his childhood in Durango and Markina, being a teenager and a young man in Gernika. In December 1963 he entered the underground as a member of ETA. From north to south he moved to Venezuela in 1966. Bachelor of Information Sciences. He completed his training in Barcelona and Bordeaux. He was director of the journal Egin (1980-1987) and deputy director of Deia (1989-95). Director of Euskadi Radio (1995-1999) and EITB International (1999-2010). In recent years he has written a series of books on Basque nationalism, on the PNV and on ETA.

Koro Garmendia: Former EE member and PNV member in
San Sebastian, 1956. Bachelor of Philosophy and Literature. Professor of the Institute. He was a parliamentarian in the Basque Parliament during the 1986-1989 legislature of the hand of Euskadiko Ezkerra. He was also a Member of the Congress of Deputies between 1989-1993. He entered the Euskal Ezkerra party, separated from Euskadiko Ezkerra. When this party was dissolved, he joined the PNV and was Deputy Tourism Advisor of the Basque Government. Between 1995 and 2003 he was a councillor at the City Hall of Donostia-San Sebastián on behalf of the PNV.

Joxemari Olarra: Sortu
Villabona, 1957. At the age of fourteen, he distributed propaganda in Tolasaldea. It was the time of the Burgos process. He was arrested three times in the 1970s. He entered ETA at the age of seventeen and fled to Iparralde in 1974. He returned with the 1977 amnesty. He was arrested in 1978, six times in the 1980s, seven times in the 1990s and two times in the 2000s. He was arrested in 2000 and charged in case 18/98. In 2007 he was re-arrested and imprisoned; in 2014 he left prison. He has been a member of the European Union. He is currently a member of the Sortu. He works in the Elkar publishing house.