In the words of Mixel Berhokoirigoin, politics is a very complicated task. That is why he says that politics must be collective work. It has equated the Luhuso initiative, which has committed itself to the disarmament of ETA, with which it has led the Chamber of Agriculture: “When I was prosecuted for creating the cabin, they put the spotlight on my head. It tends to personalise collective work. However, I have always thought that this task is not exclusive to a leader.”

He was president of the Chamber of Agriculture for ten years: “I accepted the position because I relied more on teamwork than on my head. And this is not a theoretical speech or a slogan. As seen in the House, we are achieving the goals among all, it is achieved by sharing the work of ‘success’.”

Ten years later, he is back under judicial control, along with four other Luhuso activists. They are charged in the French courts, and they are accused of public disorder. The five cannot be seen and cannot leave the state. The five people who were arrested by the Police in Luhuso are well known in Iparralde, each in its area, as historical militants. The local media have designated the artisans of Peace: “We have not sought that name, we have the enthusiasm for peace, but we do not want to carry the flag of peace. But it’s true, after they’ve gone free they’ve called us this way,” Berhokoirigoin said humbly.

However, it has approved calling the spontaneous movement that has emerged as a result of its action: “It’s beautiful, it’s beautiful, but it’s hard to take it on. In addition, it must be pointed out that there have been many people working as a peace-maker. But not everyone has appeared publicly just in case.”

Engaging in the peace process

He says that the scope of his commitment has been a process. He didn’t get up one day and thought that “we have to get involved in this issue.” In view of the blockade of the peace process in Euskal Herria, he has participated in several peace conferences, including those in Baiona and Paris. It has been concerned about the issue in an even more interested way because both States give a resounding "no" to the process: “Although a party involved in armed conflicts – the Spanish State and the French State, in this case – refuses at first, I believe that a moment of consolidation of the process must be reached. However, is involvement in the issue in the hands of ‘emblematic people’?’, I’ve often wondered.”

The former President of the House of Agriculture doubts the achievements of mere individual commitments. In his view, the procedure for carrying out any initiative should be carefully worked out. For a long time he has wondered in his head: “If the rest of the conflicts have been addressed through dialogue – and that is not entirely assured either – why not here?”

Despite the cessation of the armed struggle, the process is not a mechanical matter, it is aware that time was needed: “Perhaps some thought that, by stopping the armed struggle, the next steps would be taken automatically.” However, he has also been surprised, as time has passed, to see the solution of the conflict stuck. I thought it took time, its rhythm ...: “But from a moment on, I’ve realized that time is especially against us. Two are the main risks, that society is detached from the problem and, at the head of everything, that we are all satisfied. That is, to think that there is no armed struggle, no violence, therefore the situation is normalized”.

This militant for the Basque cause fears the slowness of the process. That the victims of the conflict, the prisoners and the suffering of all should not be a priority in society, other than the problem of society. “Standardisation” or the elimination of this large unresolved problem: “Frustration can increase. A conflict that does not end with a minimum of respect leaves seeds to re-fertilize the form of conflict of the past.”

Civil society involvement is essential for the interlocutor. If the problem is not of sufficient interest to the people, there will be insufficient force to involve the institutions in the process, and the institutions must also inevitably commit themselves: “The key is in society, if people don’t make the issue live, nobody else will get involved in the problem.” This low-level farmer has never been in the line of armed struggle, not even close. However, ETA has now become involved in helping to disarm: “Surely, some have thought: What have they entered? Our distances from the armed struggle strategy are well known, but helping to end the consequences is everyone’s task. We're not celestial, but we think it's our theme. I am referring above all to the three of us who have exchanged letters with ETA [Tubina, Txetx eta bera], but we are not the only ones, there are more people in our liver. We talked to different people from Euskal Herria. We have reflected on action in a larger group, we are people of all kinds, and separately, we have different conceptions about conflict.”

We have asked our interlocutor for the other participants in this group: “You want to know who they are, but I won’t give you a name.” He has told us that these peace activists have wanted to "take the temperature" of many significant people. The levels of involvement have been different. Some were up to date; others were well aware of the reason for the action: “And we’re happy. What we have done, not only understood, but it has been generally accepted. The action has served to re-link to the dynamics of the process. We have acted with caution. There are people who haven’t been with us at all and we’ve been concerned not to give “poisonous gifts” to those nearby.” The fact that ETA’s disarmament cannot materialise hampers the peace process is a very complicated part of it: “Many people have spoken and are acting with discretion. But for example, a person can become a friend or a hindrance. Although to round off our action it would have been interesting to make known the names of those people, those people will not help them in the future. Moreover, if one day they say they know the action, they can cause difficulties. For their responsibility, in the institutions or in other tasks, it is better that they do not know who they are.” It is not easy to break the path of peace.

However, the news of Luhoso's action has reached the South. For the first time in a long time, all parties except pp and PSE-EE have agreed on the need to speed up the peace process. The echo of the action has also reached some high-level classes in France. Upon returning from Paris, seeing the reception of the detainees, the crowd met in the street: “The concerns of the electorate and our action have been met. This has happened spontaneously, it has not been prepared. When you see the faces of many people and their gestures, you realize that something has moved. Did it do better? Of course, we haven’t achieved what we wanted, but we’ve realized what we’ve done was necessary.”

The Luhuso initiative was gradually prepared. The so-called “Peacemakers” aimed to take great action to put the issue of disarmament on the first page of the political agenda: “It had previously been a kind of symbolic disarmament by ETA, and we did not want it to be repeated. Even though the police paralyzed our action, those who do not want to open the process have valued our participation differently.”

Mixel Berhokoirigoin has repeated the following: “Within the action there is a collective reflection. Our concern was the ‘limit’ of action. We did not want an action that was not accepted. We didn't want to break with what we've done so far. The work of International Observers, for example. Without harming anyone, we wanted to shake society and political actors.”

State blockade

The interlocutor has long said that ETA is prepared to disarm itself with weapons inventories. However, states have blocked the possibility of disarmament: “And we have taken that step. We knew that and we know that coming into contact with ETA is dangerous. The adversaries, ‘look, you are involved with ETA’, have said immediately.” ETA, on the other hand, has trouble taking the weapons off the top. “That is, the problem remains as it is or risks are assumed.” In Berhokoirigoin ' s view, the step taken to move the process forward has been an obligatory step. They have given ETA the status of: “You have to leave the political management of your weapons to society.” The fact that ETA has recognised this is, in its view, very important.

They were aware that the police intervention could be a police intervention, the plan they had prepared had another objective: “We didn’t have plan B, of course. The aim was to transfer the disarmament of action to the Government of France. Informing international actors and taking into account the political and social actors here.” What had happened in Luhuso? “Only the three of us who did not know the initiative, as we have said, a larger group knew the intention of our action. I don't know if each of you told one of those next door and all along.

It got bigger. Or the police have the means to follow everyone and control everything. I don’t know, I don’t know,” the militant for peace confesses.

In his opinion, the Paris RAID, an elite police officer, heard about the action the same day. The police knew something, but not everything. At the head of everything, the repudiation of Luhuso’s action has come back against them: “They’ve been wrong. If the search for the operation is political, the State has lost it. The traditional version of the French Government has collapsed, it has not worked. The French media have followed the version of the Interior Minister, thinking that this is an anti-terrorist operation, they have brought us as members of ETA’s management.”

The activists, however, immediately published the letters exchanged with ETA, detailing its meaning and its instructions. The version of the Ministry of the Interior has also been drowned by waves of demonstrations. The questioner says that what happened has been a mystery: “However, the assembly of this police operation is not credible if it then returns politically against them. They waited to find something else that night. If they had known that they were in Luhuso, they would not have acted like this. They thought the Etarras were destroying the weapons, but no, it was us.”

After the action of Luhuso

Has anything changed after disarmament, with a view to the peace process? : "To begin with, in Iparralde you have seen people who had not moved until now in the demonstrations. They were whole families, never seen anything like that. Perhaps our presence has opened some doors to our message. There are people who have started to take an interest in the situation of the conflict because we have been involved. They know that we don't go into anything and they've come close to trying to understand the problem. We do not want to personalize what happened, but naski, that has been one of the most innovative aspects of the initiative. Our activity has helped to overcome some lines and generate a reflection of the people. ‘If they’ve got involved in it, we need to understand at least what’s going on,’ they thought.

Politicians have also taken a step further in their involvement so far, they have spoken louder than ever before. Government members and MPs have been mobilized, a broad movement and a social network have been activated: “Alain Rousset [President of the Regional Council] has supported us in the Luhuso initiative, gathered the New Aquitaine Assembly and sent his message to Paris. Rousset agreed that we should do so. Within the PSE there are different positions regarding the ETA problem”. On his return from Paris, Berhokoirigoin said in the press: “It is now society that has the political responsibility of ETA’s arsenal.” It
confirms that it still thinks the same thing: "If the reason for ETA is the people, it does not have to have a contradiction, it has to leave political management to the people. Of course, that difference needs to be worked out and made better, but that argument is not small, that is, we say to the states ‘if you don’t want to talk to ETA, don’t talk, but talk to us’”.

It is the result of a work started a long time ago: “It is the contribution that Ipar Euskal Herria can make to the whole of Euskal Herria, on that long road, with step by step and striped line, we have brought to our longing a bite higher up, and we have to follow. The greatest achievement has been to carry out this action and not to divide the political actors. And no pretensions. Sometimes I hear the ‘North is our north’. But we have two different stories, we have not had institutions, and maybe that has helped us to understand politics in a different way. The fact that we do not have an institution of our own has helped to promote understanding among those who want it. When you ask for something, you need to work your argument and its essence together with others.” In other words: “We have been in the duty of the Basque institution for fifteen years, a political culture has been consolidated. When we were born together, we saw that it was the road. This has helped to resolve at the same time the conflicts between us, to formalize in some way what society wants in a plural way. When you have some power, like in the South, you behave differently.”

From his point of view, it will be a new opportunity to take steps in the peace process: “We have to take advantage of the effect of Luhuso’s action to do a new test. The present government has a life of three months, and the last part, on the occasion of the election campaign, is going to be poisoned. The deadline is short, but in many cases it is done in three months which is not done in five years. In this short stage it is possible to take a further step, but we have to work discreetly.”