The re-election is the only option for the Spanish Government’s President to remain in the office of President. In this case, the pp may have no choice but to present Rajoy and, if he recovers some of the votes that have escaped to Citizens by that means, he may extend the short victory of 20 December.

Therefore, in principle, pp may be the most favorable to repeat elections. On the other hand, the other parties have reason to fear new elections. In practice, it would be a “second round” whose effects are well measured in countries with electoral systems in both rounds. Except for exceptions, in general, participation and the number of votes going to the two main formations increases.

In Spain, the only case in which a second-round election is analysed is that of Andalusia. The 1994 regional elections were won by the PSOE, but for governance it needed the support of the United Left (IU). The instability was such that new elections were held on 3 March 1996: participation increased by 10%, particularly in favour of the Socialists. IU was condemned for not supporting the left-wing agreement and for a useful vote.

If it were a second round, the pp would get the useful vote from the right, but among those on the left there is no clear leadership to achieve it. In Andalusia, the PSOE had 45 Members and IU with 20, which made a big difference in identifying the useful vote. In the current Congress of Deputies, the main progressive forces have voted in a similar way (341,000 votes for the Socialists) and the distance in the Members is not so great for 90 Socialists and 69 for Podemos and its allies. To this you can add that in the sum of almost a million votes that IU has cast, we can mobilise a useful vote in its favour.

Close competition hampers agreement between parties that can be allies in public policies, as they are enemies in the distribution of resources (suffrage/office/power). Therefore, the struggle is in the narrative of the negotiations. If the left-wing government is not satisfied, what the voters designate as the culprit will be the loser in the struggle for the left-wing leadership. That fear can lead Podemos and the PSOE to agree. If so, they would have an initial journey to push back the laws and reforms put in place by the pp: The Moorish law, the LOMCE, labor reform, the abortion law and Article 135 of the Constitution that limits public spending. Article (the latter powered by the PSOE).

However, it is known that there will be resistance on the part of the factual powers and the socialists at their disposal. However, the alternative is not easy. A large coalition, explicit or disguised, defending the regime would be very dangerous for the PSOE, which would suffer great wear and tear and could no longer be the main reference of the left. Therefore, what would cost the PSOE the least would be an agreement between the PSOE and Citizens with the abstention of pp. But to reach that point, first of all, pp and factual powers should see and feel that a left-wing coalition can be possible and credible. So far, Pedro Sánchez has made some gestures to the left-wing coalition, such as the visit to Portugal, but if he wants to be president of the government, there will be more.