The Catalan elections have been plebiscitary. All the data has made this clear. The best results obtained from the candidacies that clearly answered the question, participation has been the second highest ever recorded in Catalonia and most interpretations, among parties and among the international media, have been plebiscite.

For the first time in history, Catalonia exercises its right to decide on its political status. When a country takes that step, there is no turning back, and that is known to the State of origin, so if it is prudent, it regulates that right. Therefore, if anyone has won the elections on 27 September, that has been the Catalan people. In the domestic and international sphere, the presence of a sovereign demos has been made known in Catalonia.

Another thing is independence. Visitors have achieved very good results, but they are not enough to reach the last stop. Unilateral demands for vote based secession have been supported by a majority of at least two-thirds in Parliament or in the referendum. Therefore, 47.74% of Catalan deputies are not enough to achieve independence, but rather to move forward with the secessionist process, as the absolute majority of Members of Parliament will be independent.

For the future, the first challenge for Spain will be the next general election, which will take place in December. In Catalonia they can play the second role of the round. If unionism produces good results, it will affect the secessionist process. The same can happen with the results at national level, which will give much to talk about in Barcelona. Based on these, three scenarios can be foreseen for 2016 and 2017:

1) Madrid is breaking the unilateral dynamic after the December elections in order to adapt the process to its legality. It faces serious constitutional reform and an attractive proposal for Catalonia, proposing a new status and recognizing the right to decide for its secession in line with the Canadian law of clarity.

(2) The new independence Government will deepen the unilateral strategy as the Catalan State is being built, and will force the defenders of the third way to stand, especially if no serious proposal is forthcoming from Spain. Therefore, voters and third-way politicians will have many incentives to be linked to independence. If at some point there is a unilateral proclamation of independence in the Catalan Parliament, it is likely to be supported by a wider majority than that of the current 72 Members. From that moment on, Catalan legality marks the time when the constituent elections or the referendum on secession are held.

3) In the second scenario, before ending independence, Spain, desperate and under external pressure, could sign a confederation agreement (can take several names) with the new Catalan State and recognize its right to self-determination (probably with a cadence of a few years, that is, the commitment not to use it in three, four or X years).

In the December elections, it does not seem that Spain is going to put aside its blindness, but if the Catalans continue to do things well, the West is going to force Spain to negotiate the third scenario. If the European Union and NATO have to accept internal secession, they will prioritise doing so passionately, in a controlled and orderly manner, thus avoiding drastic changes.