The Catalan Government wants to achieve the democratic transfer of the monopoly of violence within the framework of the legality of the State of origin (Spain). Under these conditions, the international recognition of the new State is automatic. However, the States of Origin that allow the referendum have great advantages in stopping the secessionist process, for three reasons:

A) The State of origin has the advantage of negotiating the terms and times of the referendum. (b) If a State has recognized the right to decide on a territory, some of those who are to vote in a referendum may vote in favour of the non-economic instability that independence can generate, provided that it believes that it will have time to exercise secession. And C) The State of origin has at its service all the apparatus of State in the referendum campaign and before to strengthen its positions in its favour.

In other words, if the referendum is agreed from the outset, there will be no situation of extreme tension, which makes it difficult to strengthen the positions for independence. In Catalonia, however, what is happening is the opposite, the tension is increasing because they have denied them recognition of their status as a nation and subsequently denied them the right to decide. If Spain agrees to hold a referendum increasingly later in Catalonia, its position to control the agenda and avoid secession will be weaker.

If the November 9 consultation was successful for something, it is because it was a measured exercise of civil disobedience, limited but very significant by the level of protection. The framework of sovereign power was conceived and exercised outside the control of the Spanish State. A significant part of Catalan society voted to disobey the prohibition that Spanish laws and institutions had decreed.

However, the Spanish State still has many tools in its hands to curb the process of deannexation of Catalonia. If the referendum were held before the "plebiscite" elections, it would have the capacity to curb the transition to Catalan legality and return to the parameters of Spanish legality. But that doesn't seem to be the case. If it does so after the elections and before the proclamation of a possible unilateral independence, Spain will still have the power to partially control the agenda and the referendum, even if it is very weakened. If, on the contrary, it negotiates after the credible proclamation of the Catalan State, under international pressure, a more balanced negotiation between the two governments would take place and the new Catalan law would be strengthened.

Three main aspects may appear in a negotiation: the requirement for minimum participation in the referendum, the exile and the need for special majorities to determine the time (dates). Remember what happened in Scotland or Montenegro, even though the two proposals for de-annexation were cheap for the states of origin, the conditions were imposed on them. In Scotland, the nationalists wanted three possible answers, but London imposed one date and two answers. In Montenegro, three conditions were imposed: not having a referendum in three years, having a minimum participation of 50% and votes in favour of disengagement exceeding 55%.

Catalonia is not prepared to remain in the unstable limbo in which Abkhazia and Kosovo live, although it will negotiate with the Govern ment despite the declaration of independence. Spain, which has so much to lose, is blind. However, international pressure will force you to negotiate sooner or later.