In the 1973 war of YOM KIPUR, Egypt and Syria welcomed Israel more closely than they thought, and if the United States had not helped him greatly, who knows what was going to happen. Or yes, with all the data we have, it is very imaginable that Israel would impose itself, but perhaps under other conditions. The fact is that, in the first four days, Israel lost 500 ground assault vehicles and more than 80 aircraft. And in the face of gravity, he transported 13 nuclear artifacts to a tunnel to have them at hand in case the situation worsened greatly.

He did not need, as usual, Richard Nixon, then President of the United States, the immediate supply of aircraft and tanks, and Israel soon turned the situation around. However, not everyone in the White House shared the same view on the action, especially Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Nixon himself ran in his first legislature from the hand of Kissinger and, again, the vision of the nearest secretary was imposed.

On that occasion, the UN managed to launch the ceasefire, but Israel continued to attack, particularly against Egypt, with the unconditional support of the United States. On 20 October 1973, Kissinger went to Moscow to negotiate the truce's accounts, and when he passed through Tel Aviv, he urged them to be the Israelis who could continue to attack Egypt that night, even if he had been in truce, because he would say nothing. During the days there was a situation of tension between the USSR and the United States, since Moscow announced that it would not accept that position and that it would take action by Israel. Kissinger launched the situation of DEFCON III in the United States, the highest readiness to war in the state of peace, and from 24 to 25 October lived one of the greatest risks of nuclear conflict in the time of the cold war (one of the hundreds of representative stories that historian Josep Fontana tells in his book For the Sake of the Empire).

The nuclear risk component was there, but also that of oil, which was one of the causes of the discrepancies between Schlesinger and Kissinger, among others. Saudi Arabia had to go out in defense of Syria, and the loss of the war caused great discomfort in many sectors of the United States, because it was very afraid of what was going to happen to Saudi oil.

Oil, nuclear weapons, Israel, the Arab countries and the United States remain the main components of the Middle East and the Atlantic Alliance. The USSR, the main enemy of the United States, is missing, and that is why the United States must first create its own enemy, first Iraq, or later Iran and North Korea. Meanwhile, at one point, the Israeli attack on Syria seems to be looking more towards Iran than towards the Bashar al-Assad regime.

At the moment it is not clear at what stage of the Iranian nuclear programme is in relation to the achievement of the nuclear weapon, but these Israeli attacks on Syria appear to have more connection with this nuclear race and with its oil than with the Hezbollah, which is no more than an excuse. In 1991, with the outbreak of the first war in Iraq, Saddam Hussein died in the invasion of Kuwait and the UN authorized the attack on Irak.Segun United States, Iraqi oil was not among the causes of the attacks, but the documents that have been made public recently www.monde-diplomatique.fr/48797 show a very different perspective from the current one.

The Persian Gulf accounts for 60% of world oil reserves, while Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran account for the largest quantities. After controlling oil in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, Iran is missing. But not only that, that Iran gets an atomic weapon can break Israel’s absolute military supremacy and, as far as possible, it must also be avoided. In history there is no permanent empire, and sooner or later that superiority of Israel and the United States will break, or they will be structured with other balances, creating new powers and alliances. In the meantime, he who wants to maintain superiority has to attack and that is what Israel is doing.