At a time when fundamental changes are taking place in the political situation in Euskal Herria, I am mixed with hope and fear, as with many others. I do not forget that the transition to the end of Franco, in a very vague way, I cannot deny that the situation improved and that it was won in democracy, it would be unfair not to recognise it. But it wasn't all done right. The old regime, despite giving in to the new situation, continued to have a great power of influence, and they became noticeable (not the smallest, the continuation of the security forces and the justice system in Spain). We are suffering the consequences of a still totally imperfect transition.

Now, again, I fear that the age of ETA or the armed struggle will not close safely and intelligently; if they end, but half and half. Why do I say that? Because the ancillary circumstances that have existed in other successful peace processes are not accepted in our country; here it is a question of settling with a little intimidation the accounts of the last 50 years and feeling rather strong temptations to establish the peace of the victors or the most powerful, which is not true peace.

Something similar can be seen, but said with much more shadow and experience, from the conference that Brian CURRIN offered last summer at the Miramar Palace: “Looking at the peace processes that I have experienced more closely over the past 20 years, I have identified 9 fundamental requirements or conditions: if they are fulfilled, they will allow a successful negotiated solution; the more of these faults, the less likely they are to achieve a lasting peace.”

These are the 9 requirements (and each one will be able to see to what extent they are met or not in our environment):

1. At the political level, the protagonists must feel a priority and shared need for a peaceful and negotiated solution.

2. On both sides, political leaders must have the support of their armed forces, some of the State forces, the army and the official police, and others of the unofficial militants.

3. There is a need for a permanent commitment among the protagonists to a peaceful and negotiated solution.

4. Great leadership is an advantage: Mandela factor.

5. An environment is needed that enables a negotiated solution, which basically guarantees the same conditions to all parties and is often referred to as confidence-building measures.

6. A structured and transparent peace process is needed.

7. Responsible media are needed to recognize the need for peace and to protect the peace process as a national cause.

8. Citizenship, through civil social organisations, must be involved in peace actions at all possible levels.

9. It needs constructive and impartial international assistance.

Whoever wants to know what Currin thinks about the situation of these nine factors in the Basque Country, the editorial Elkar will soon publish Euskal Herria: You can go to the book Reality and Utopia.

An illustrative data on how to “solve” the conflict here is the treatment given to mediators or collaborators. Being foreigners and people outside the conflict, it is to be assumed that they will have sufficient impartiality and objectivity, because no, here their intervention has been considered uncomfortable and annoying by pro-State politicians, the media, opinion leaders, in the best cases, and despised and insulted by pride in many others. I believe that if you want to open green windows – and do not shout – to the future, the cooperation of these intermediaries is very appreciable.

So Welcome Mr. Currin and the ICG!