As for the first clash, the forces of Chavism act together against the empire and against the right-wing forces that applaud the external intervention (more than the right would be more appropriate to name the ultra-right; it should be noted that there are sectors of the right that do not support external intervention). Despite the different readings of leftist agents on the development of the process (from government to institutional plurality), despite the obvious ideological differences, and despite the fact that accusations of corruption and clientelism are very present against some government and institutional positions, the Chavistas are aware of the importance of unity and act moderately. Because what is said and done is said and done, but trying to limit the debate in the public sphere. Some government and institutional positions, as well as members of the PSUV, are subject to criticism and complaints (not so much to President Maduro, who has very broad support among the Chavists), but with the caution of not using class enemies for their own benefit. The various sectors and agents of Chavism know that the government must be maintained in order to save the process. The continuity of the Chavista Government is essential if we are to make progress in the construction of socialism and if the revolutionary agents continue to work without the repression of the State. To a large extent, it can be said that it is a violent external attack that currently maintains the unity of Chavism. It can also be said that it is Maduro who keeps attached to chavism.

In other words, this second shock, which occurs within Chavism, is also a real class struggle, with revolutionaries who want to build socialist society on one side and reformists and bourgeois society on the other. In the early years of President Chavez, Boliburgesis began to be discussed: the pseudochavists embedded in the government itself and in the state apparatus. These bureaucrats, dressed in a Chavista speech in the mouth and a red flannel (t-shirt), take advantage of their positions of power to bring personal benefits, without believing in the Bolivarian project and in the transformation of the system. Moreover, they are scared by the transformation of the system, because they would lose their privileged position. As has happened in other transformative processes, in the face of the incessant rise of Chavism, the ambitions and opportunists that were incorporated into the project occupy positions in governmental infrastructures, at the state level, in departments, in mayors and in many other administrative centers. Some of them have worked in the centres of power to do their business, using their influence, and have formed a new bourgeoisie. Mixed with them, there are also former activists of the sociopolitical movement who feel comfortable in the management of power, acting from a misunderstood pragmatism with a conservative attitude, becoming an obstacle to the radicalization of the process. These sectors and behaviors weaken the development of the process, as well as the honest and persevering work of many other revolutionary militants in political and administrative positions. Although they have been present since the beginning of Chavism, with the physical disappearance of the figure of Chávez and the difficult situation of recent years, the divergent and reformist positions within the government have been strengthened. In fact, the context Maduro is facing has been really difficult. The president has been forced to deal with the emotional despair linked to the disappearance of Chavez, the serious economic crisis, the attacks and guarimbas of the fascist right, attempts at attack, media distortion and all kinds of imperialist attacks. Moreover, for security reasons, their mobility in Venezuela has been restricted in recent times. The phrase "since he has arrived he has not been let rest; they have given it hard"), in the mouth of the Chavist militants, recognizes the difficult role of Maduro and the merit of moving forward, as well as the broad attachment to Maduro among critics.

From some government sectors it is seen that private companies are more efficient and, at a time when the increase in production is a priority, the intention is to open the way to private companies, returning land recovered from private hands, facilitating the financing or facilitating the management of some businesses such as the import of external products. Poor experience with some companies acquired by the State facilitates the adoption of these measures. An important part of these consciences of the capitalists goes into the hands of the boliburgia. In this way, these powerful Sasichaval sectors, many even linked to the Armed Forces, which are integrated into the government itself, are taking steps backwards in the socialization of the economy, returning to the bourgeoisie the various economic areas that have been subdued to the bourgeoisie.

In this context is the new concept used by the Minister of Agriculture and Land, Wilmar Castro Sotelo, which includes the same contradiction: “revolutionary bourgeoisie”, a bourgeoisie willing to increase domestic production. Given the precarious situation in obtaining all kinds of products and services, the increase in production through capitalist companies and the importation of products not produced in Venezuela would contribute to alleviate the problem of supply, at least if it is well managed by the government, in a planned way, controlling sales prices and focused on responding to the needs of the country, something that is actually perceived very difficult in the current Venezuela. From this point of view, it would not help the radicalization of the process, but, in this context of aggression, it would contribute to the protection of the process, giving encouragement to the Government and alleviating the plight of large, modest sections of the population. In this phase of resistance, the use of capitalist instruments could be understood as a concession, with the intention of surviving the process. One step backwards to take two steps forward. However, there is scope to call a bourgeoisie "revolutionary" working in the capitalist logic of increasing the rate of profit and raising capital, which has been taken by many revolutionary Venezuelans with a single bourgeois.

The bourgeois sectors within the Government also seek to weaken the communal structure, as they work collectively to cultivate land, transform and distribute food or to offer some services such as filling and distributing gas cylinders. They demonstrate that another model is possible, claiming in a practical way the path marked by Chávez. The intention, therefore, is to obstruct the efficiency and dissemination of the commons, even if they cannot be publicly acknowledged. It's a real paradox. While some government ministries are receiving material and ideological support, other ministries and bodies are acting contrary to the common, making public the silent struggle of competing interests and aspirations within the Government.

Given this, the main challenges of the Chavista sectors organized in the commons are coordination, joint work and access to more sectors to have an increasing presence and power in Venezuelan society. In this way, together with other agents and more conscious sectors, they will be able to cope with the influence of the traditional bourgeoisie and the boliburgesis in the government. Only in this way will the gradual progress of the Chavism project be halted and the process radicalised. To do so, they are trying to create a structure of common at the national level, to move from isolated experiences and struggles to a general project, which completes the structure of the community state represented by Chávez.