I already had a year off of Emilio López Adán Negro: “The history of ETA is not a straight line without notches. The decision to accept terrorism was a major break. The attacks on civilians to bend the state are terrorism (more than 300 victims) and paying for it: losing the trust of the people, giving the game to the enemies, accentuating the failure of the military-political strategy, opening terrible wounds in the crowd.”

In fact, from the birth of ETA to the end of its activity, there have been significant strategic changes, which cannot be denied. Although the ETA of initiation expressed itself in its writings in favor of the model of “citizen’s war” in Vietnam or Algeria, it immediately rejected the path towards such a strategic pretension and the famous “action-oppressive action” spiral that was supposed to stimulate a popular struggle that would become much simpler and more pragmatic, and that would last almost until the end of the dictatorship.

During the transition period, ETA developed a strategy that sought to achieve negotiation with the State, showing the greatest capacity for aggression than ever. He was able to multiply the number of bloody attacks, always limiting or prioritizing the exception to the different repressive apparatus (there were still politicians and businesspeople targeted, but not in a systematic way).

And finally, as opportunities for negotiation diminished, ethical, political and operational constraints were overcome.

How far away were the initial doubts and balances about the use of violence, in which the main concern was how to reconcile goals and paths. I'm talking about her. When the same militants who planted the bomb in the headquarters of El Correo Español in Eibar realized that there was a worker at work, they tried to deactivate the bomb by suffering a serious accident. The surprise and concern that the wounded militant fleeing the fall of El Corrial caused in the Organization and in the locality the death of a taxi driver is noteworthy. You can't believe one of us could have killed an employee, except accidentally or in an accident.

The group that participated in the attraction of La Naval had a clear mandate: “Whatever happens, threaten them, but don’t shoot the workers. And that's why they captured the only woman in La Argentinita's command. The workers surrounded him, probably because he was a girl, but the militant did not respond by shooting at them. What to say about the confusion and confusion that followed the massacre of ETA in the Rolando cafeteria. It was still believed that there was an ethical difference in the violence of the enemy and the organization, and that the people distinguished it well. “The state was stronger militarily, but not ethically.” That was the starting point.

The kidnapping and subsequent murder of the jealous businessman Ángel Berazadi also caused surprise, but less. Little by little, consciously or taking dynamics beyond what they wanted, they were giving changes within ETA.

However, when the Autonomous Command assassinated the senator of the PSOE Casas, the Popular Union not only dismissed this action. The last time, until the decision to end the armed cycle, the nationalist left condemned an armed action.

The armed activity of ETA became increasingly militaristic, to the detriment of political strategy. Increasingly politically weaker and more violent! Instead of winning hearts and attracting solidarity, it seemed to be aimed at conquering the disgust and boredom of the people, in the hope that this would create a favourable climate for negotiation in society.

What was initially an exception was almost made into law. The condemnation of this infamous act could not be limited to political inadequacy, but legitimacy must also be challenged. We consider Hipercor’s as a milestone and Miguel Ángel Blanco’s and similar’s claim that ETA was taking the path to the abyss. And worst of all, the fact that with this unacceptable drift, the Patriotic Left was also being badly hurt by us was becoming more and more obvious. When they proclaimed or theorized the “socialization of suffering,” and jumped to the almost indiscriminate use of “car bombs,” our disagreement was total and total. Without forgetting that the persistence of the conflict strengthened the tiredness and the desire to end it.

In the face of this evolution, on the far left, we were not all silent. None of that! It wasn't a sweet thing. In fact, how to distinguish it from the activity of ETA without, like many others (EPK, EE), being captured within the framework of the state and the system. That's where the key was. And that’s where the key lies, in the days after ETA.

It's late, but thankfully, that's all over. ETA by itself (this is very important and remarkable) has ended its career and, unlike the Francoist heir or those who promoted the dirty war, has made a self-criticism about the damage caused, which is questionable or insufficient but has not been discussed in this article.

We will have to figure out how to move forward, but I find it difficult without talking about what we have learned in those long years: in the context of patriotism, the two main strategies that have been in force, (those of the Guernica Statute, on the one hand, and the armed struggles, on the other) have obviously failed in each case for different reasons. It is time to start a new path, which will be a "way out", which with that of Catalonia will not be able to "cock and copy", but which will have similar characteristics: It will focus on a strong and self-constituted popular movement for the Basque Republic. It was from the street that it will push from the institutions (existing and those that will have to be created) and sooner or later it will have to collide with the state.

By Joxe Iriarte, Bikila

Member of the alternative