President Carlos Arias Navarro, appointed by Franco and ratified in the first government founded by King Juan Carlos, did not gain credibility from Franco until Spanish democracy, nor law for it to come by reform, but after him, Suárez, appointed in July 1976. How did it, from July 1976 to June 1977?

An important milestone was the Law on Political Reform adopted by the Francoist Courts in November 1976 (425 of the 531 prosecutors approved it), and in the December referendum, voted by 77 per cent of the census, it obtained a positive vote of 94.17 per cent. With this victory and under the control of the media at the time, especially RTVE, Suárez was not difficult to give an appearance of centrality, to position himself between the Franco bunker and the democratic opposition, and to delve into the Coles, being president, that is, having in his hands the most important institutional powers, to present himself to the elections, and to win, of course!

Until July 1976 there were francoists and democratic opposition, two political poles, and shortly thereafter, as a result of Suárez’s attempts to divide the opposition and keep the bunker on the runway (106 prosecutors, quantifying in some way), Suárez himself placed in the center, and the bunker and the opposition on two corners: the ideal position to win votes.

It may be interesting to analyze how President Suárez controlled the bunker with the head of State Juan Carlos, designated successor by Franco, and how the Francoist reformist gathered the reformists at UCD, but even more interesting to explain how he managed to destroy the entire program of democratic opposition, and that the primary objective of the former opponents was to win votes in June 1977, and above all, to achieve the opposition.

In the previous article I mentioned that Felipe González met in April 1975 with the powerful leaders of the German Social Democratic Party and convinced them that the situation of Spain and that of Portugal were different, that after Franco's death the revolution would not occur in Spain and also rejected the immediate end of the dictatorship, and that his intention was that the government of the Western monarchy be dismantled and built together with the opposition. And they had the PCE as a rival, not as allies. It was necessary to send to the deepest historical anti-fascist memory of Republicanism – which the ECP had the leadership in the fight against Franco – to interrupt the street mobilisations – the reform to negotiate the parties’ apparatus – with the aim of becoming the hegemonic force of the opposition in the elections in June 1977.

Suárez soon met with Felipe González, who legalized the PSOE of the historic Llopis to make him nervous, but at the same time made it clear to the PSOE that it was his favorite of the opposition, and to the PCE the devil, the European socialists and the Spanish bunker, and so did. The PSOE was legalized in February 1977, after the success and self-confidence of the Law of Political Reform. The Francoist Single Movement Bunker was dissolved and finally legalized the last of the major political parties, the PCE, in April 1977. The PCE was very busy knowing that the PSOE was ready to go to the elections even though he had not legalized it. The Monarchy, and the reform of the government that she appointed, came to praise Carrillo, with the objective of legalization, and the elections as the main keys. Other aspects were not legalized, such as CKD in Catalonia, and some in the Basque Country, as we know, but only the historical aspects, let us say. In Catalonia the CDC of Jordi Pujol prevailed, and in the peninsular Basque Country, the PNV of Xabier Arzallus and Carlos Garaikoetxea, who was elected president of the PSE.

To win the elections, the Electoral Law was one of the most important. We cannot think that Adolfo Suárez was a magician or an omniscient seer who controlled everything in the elaboration of this law – there are many unforeseeable factors – but the truth is that UCD and PSOE, with 62.7% of the votes, obtained 80.2% of the seats in the Congress and the coalition PCE, AP and Tender 21.8%. The Suárez government developed a proportional system, the famous D’Hont system, which benefits the parties that get the most votes. The PSOE achieved 29.32% of the votes, while the PCE achieved 9.33% of the votes. UCD, with 34.4% votes, 165 seats and 106 senators, while the PSOE, with 118 and 35 members, did not have 20 Members and no Senator. 20% of the senators were named “by the finger” by Juan Carlos as Chief of Staff.

Those who fought against Franco were condemned to oblivion; it became an account of the drift of the impartial government, considered essential for the holding of democratic elections; it was the head of the Suárez Government who prepared the elections, with all the powers in hand and presenting to him with UCD, who won them. And that Parliament was formed and, therefore, the results of those votes completely conditioned the Constitution of 1978, which has been imposed on us for forty-three years. In the drafting paper of the Constitution, seven men, three from UCD, one from PSOE and another from AP, and two from Catalans, non-Basque. But that's a topic for another article.