In Stepanakert, the capital of Karabakh Garaia, the images we have seen belong to a ghost town: the streets are empty, only objects abandoned by the Armenian population can be found in haste. In addition to the capital, almost the entire region has become empty of Armenians, most of the population has escaped before the arrival and occupation of the Azerbaijani army, which has suffered repression, humiliation or assimilation.
The self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh disappears. Azerbaijan has had 24 hours of attack to achieve the surrender of the Armenians. The Stepanakert authorities were very weakened after the 2020 war, but the latest swords have undoubtedly been the humanitarian crisis caused by the Azerian blockade and the abandonment of the Republic of Armenia.
Nikol Paxinian, Prime Minister of Armenia, came to power in 2018 helped by the color revolution. His program was based on the modernization and economic development of the country, for which he intended to approach the West, to promote liberal democracy and to enhance neoliberalism. His enemy, who had until then been in power, was the clan of the politicians of Karabakh Garaia. They have a conservative nationalist ideological social tendency and geopolitically prioritize the defence of the Republic of Artsakh and its entente with Russia.
Since Paxinian took power, one of its main objectives has been to remove the influence of Karabakh Klana from the political and economic life of Armenia. Ending the Karabakh Garai conflict could bring many benefits to Paxinian’s political strategy. On the one hand, in the medium term Karabakh Klana could be greatly weakened by the disappearance of the Republic of Artsakh and, on the other, would open the opportunity to liberate the Russian anchor and move closer to the West.
It is difficult to understand how Armenia has not negotiated when it had a stronger position to return to control Karabakh Garaia Azerbaijan
If we add to all this that Azerbaijan has increasing economic, military and demographic dominance, the statements made by Paxinian at the beginning of the year seem reasonable, saying that Armenia was prepared to recognize that Upper Karabakh was the land of the State of Azerbaijan. But it was too late. Erevan lacks political realism. It is difficult to understand how Armenia has not negotiated when it had a stronger position to return to control Caravakh Garaia Azerbaijan in exchange for autonomy and security for the Armenians. If by the beginning of the 2020 war Paxinian had negotiated the handover of the region, it would have saved the lives of thousands of young people and the Armenians would probably have autonomy. Subsequently, they had another opportunity in the talks to end the war, but they did not negotiate handover in exchange for autonomy and finally, in 2023, Azerbaijan has engulfed all Karabakh Garaia without negotiation.
But that's not the end of the problem. Baku and Ankara want more, they want a corridor connecting the Turkish lands of southern Armenia between Istanbul and Baku (de facto Mar Caspio to Central Asia). In all this, Turkey is one of the main winners, as Azerbaijan is a cork with access to the raw material bottle of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. That is why the West is also very interested, so, despite the possible weddings between Armenia and NATO, they will not be enough to deal with the irredentist projects of Azerbaijan and Turkey.
The return of competition between the major powers will further confuse the margins in the Caucasus, so if the Armenian state wants to remain alive, Erevan will prefer to learn from a more pragmatic foreign policy of the current political leaders of Tbilisi.