There are countries that either achieve the two requirements partially or achieve one as a whole, taking one step forward in the other or not. Thus, some states have international recognition and have it to a significant extent. For example, the Palestinian State is recognized by 130 countries and is an observer member of the UN Assembly. The Sahrawi Democratic Arab Republic (DDR) has dozens of international recognitions, but like Palestine, it is de facto not independent.

The de facto independent countries need the support of an international power to deal with economic isolation and to secure the monopoly of violence. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would not be viable without Turkey ' s support, nor would the Republic of High Karabakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) without Armenia, Kosovo without the West or Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Donbass without Russia. But Catalonia cannot be equated with all these countries, among others, it is at the heart of the Western Empire and it is rich, so it is not prepared to move forward a true unilateral secession without a strange Dad/Mom, without a monopoly on violence and without international recognition. What Catalonia has put in place is an innovative strategy: to put pressure on the State of origin to make it feel in a peaceful and democratic way to negotiate the recognition of the right to self-determination and its implementation.

Geopolitics is one of the weak points in Catalonia. The projects and the desire for fragmentation of the USSR and Yugoslavia have been many for years, we must not be quick to distinguish between praxis and diplomatic language. Before the referendum in Slovenia arms were sold from the west to Slovenia and Croatia, and the US congress passed a law to deny funding to Yugoslavia and exclusively finance the republics. On the other hand, the West never accepted the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries and, for example, in 1983, the European Parliament adopted a motion denouncing the occupation and advocating the restoration of the independence of the Baltic countries.

The West sees the unilateral secession of Catalonia as a dangerous precedent at home and abroad. For example, how could the EU and NATO defend unilateral Catalan secession and condemn Crimea? In Crimea, in the 1990s, two referendums were held to reclaim sovereignty, in exchange for Kiev to seize autonomy, cut off electricity and dismiss the president. In 2014, the scenario was repeated and in a third referendum, 83.1% of the electoral roll endorsed secession. In the middle there was a coup d'état in Kiev, and Crimea had the support of an army and a strong state, that of Russia.

Catalonia has only one way to increase the pressure on Spain. The propaganda of low-cost independence ends. In order to force Spain to negotiate, it has to suffer the image of the West in this conflict. Proof of this is that Putin’s statements have put a double standard on the table in this matter. Pressure will continue to increase if the unilateral declaration of independence is combined with a gigantic civil disobedience exercise lasting one month, which will lead to economic and personal costs.