The demonstrators, who have been fighting on the street for two months, have celebrated the military as heroes. In the last few days, such a thing was being called for. And certainly, on August 5 of this year of Bangladesh has no affinity with the coup d’état that brought down its civilian reference government, Aung San Suu Kyi, on February 1, 2021 in Myanmar. That is to say, with which the (re)civil war began at this time, which is in full cordiality 300
kilometres from Dhaka.
But when those first few hours' sweetness has gone away, the bitterness of reality cannot fail to reappear. First in the formation of a government that should be transitional.
The temptation that it should be something that is completed without the Awami League Hasinaren, and against it, is not only a temptation, but the pressure will be strong. But to think that the Awami League is going to be an empty shell if you get kicked out of power can be a serious mistake. On the other hand, it will have to be seen how the military understands the “transition”.
And then the economy is going to give a lot to talk about. This “Anti-Quota Revolution” comes amid the macroeconomic boom caused by the fact that it has become one of the world’s largest hand-held factories. But it must not be said that this growth has a great deal to do with the hardness that the Hasina regime has exercised, even in industrial relations, and that many external investments can go down the road that came in the new situation.
In addition, the eighth country of the world per inhabitant will carefully observe the first and second of this classification; one totally bordering and another native. If Myanmar is a real headache for China, Bangladesh is even more so for India. Fortunately, neither of them wins anything by causing one crisis or another.
And even if it sounds like a sarcasm, the crises in the Gulf of Bengal seem to have smoothed the
tensions between the two largest in Asia. Otherwise, they can be enough.